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Abstract
This paper investigates zoning in two neighboring towns in which ﬁrms
are owned by investors that reside in the two towns. We ﬁnd that local
regulators use zoning strategically depending on the weight of local proﬁts
in social welfare. When they are high enough both towns are zoned. For
intermediate values an asymmetric result emerges: only one regulator
resorts to zoning despite the symmetry in the percentage of ownership of
the neighboring ﬁrms. For a low weight of local proﬁts, towns may or
may not be zoned. Zoning restrictions on the location of ﬁrms are tighter
when local proﬁts are more signiﬁcant for social welfare.
JEL Classiﬁcation: L13 . R32 . R38.
Keywords: Zoning . spatial competition . foreign ownership . loca-
tion choice.
∗Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I. Universidad del País
Vasco, UPV/EHU. Av. Lehendakari Agirre 83, 48015, Bilbao, Spain. (e-mail: juan-
carlos.barcena@ehu.es)
†Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I. Universidad del País
Vasco, UPV/EHU. Av. Lehendakari Agirre 83, 48015, Bilbao, Spain. (e-mail: fran-
ciscojavier.casado@ehu.es)
1
1 Introduction
In cities all around the world zoning regulations set the uses to which land
in a municipality may be put, e.g. residential, commercial, light or heavy in-
dustrial, recreational, and farming. Zoning design is concerned, among other
issues, with the health and safety of residents and with so called "ﬁscal zoning".1
Due to negative externalities for the population of towns, heavy industry and
some commercial activities are kept apart from residential and educational ar-
eas. However, light industry and commercial activities with few or no negative
externalities may share space with some residential areas.
This paper focuses on a subject that, to the best of our knowledge, has
received little attention from the literature on zoning: How partial ownership of
local and neighboring ﬁrms aﬀects the optimal zoning design of a municipality
when zoning is used strategically.
Literature on zoning has applied location models to analyze the eﬀect of
zoning city lands on ﬁrms’ proﬁts, consumer surplus, consumers’ transportation
costs, and social welfare.2 For example, Lai and Tsai (2004) study asymmetric
zoning: The left-hand part of a linear city is exclusively residential. Their zoning
proposal may reduce distortion in the total transportation costs of consumers
and enhance social welfare. Chen and Lai (2008) study symmetric central zoning
under spatial Cournot competition and show that zoning regulation can improve
social welfare. Colombo (2012) analyzes a spatial non-discriminatory Cournot
duopoly with a central zoning area that may be asymmetric. Finally, Bárcena-
1From the viewpoint of "ﬁscal zoning" local authorities may try to keep out relatively low-
income residents for example by increasing the size of the minimum lot for building a single-
family house or by reducing the number of apartments that can be built. A related branch of
the literature on spatial models analyzes tax competition among perfectly competitive ﬁrms
within local jurisdictions in metropolitan areas located on a line (see, for example, Braid 1993,
2000).
2The seminal work in analyzing the location of competing ﬁrms in linear cities is Hotelling
(1929): Two ﬁrms simultaneously locate within a linear city and then simultaneously decide
their prices. He assumes that consumers’ transportation costs are linear, which implies that
there is no price equilibrium when ﬁrms locate close enough (see d’Aspremont et al. 1979).
However, d’Aspremont et al. (1979) show that under quadratic transportation costs the game
has a price equilibrium for all locations of the ﬁrms.
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Ruiz et al. (2016) study an unconstrained duopoly where ﬁrms set mill prices.
A regulator biased towards consumers allows the two ﬁrms to locate in a central
area of the city while a regulator highly concerned about ﬁrms restricts them
to locations outside the city boundaries.3
The papers cited above analyze the zoning design of a single city but they
do not study zoning of neighboring towns. Empirical evidence highlights the
need to analyze the strategic interaction between local governments in neigh-
boring towns. Evidence of the strategic use of zoning is found in towns located
in the same country. Henninger (2015) states that regional shopping centers
attract residents and sales tax revenue from neighboring cities.4 Municipalities
are widely observed to encourage the location of shopping centers near or well
connected with their borders to attract foreign consumers. There is evidence of
Norwegians going shopping to Sweden (Lorentzon 2011; Löfgren 2008). Similar
evidence is found on the Dutch-German border (Spierings and van der Velde
2013), on the frontier between Mexico and the US (Sullivan et al. 2012), and
on that between Canada and the US (Timothy and Butler 2005).
Towns are run by city councils which are concerned with local welfare, so
they may use zoning to push domestic ﬁrms, which have to observe urban plan-
ning regulations, into locating in speciﬁc zones of the town. This may increase
local welfare, e.g. due to direct and indirect local employment, local tax col-
lection, and spending by shoppers on travel and meals. As a result, the use of
zoning in neighboring towns may have a strategic purpose. With regard to this
issue, Bárcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2017, 2018) analyze the use of zoning
as a strategic device for capturing economic rents from neighboring consumers
3Bárcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2014) also analyze optimal zoning when two ﬁrms can
price discriminate between consumers. Bárcena-Ruiz et al. (2014) study optimal zoning
in a mixed duopoly framework. Matsumura and Matsushima (2012) show that restricting
the locations of ﬁrms to the linear city reduces consumer welfare when ﬁrms sign strategic
reward contracts with their managers. Hamoudi and Risueño (2012) study zoning in a circular
city where ﬁrms and consumers are located on diﬀerent sides. Suzuki (2013) analyzes the
anticompetitive eﬀect of land use regulations, since zoning may discourage entry.
4Examples of strategic behavior by local authorities can be found in the US and in Europe
(see Hanssen and Foslt 1998; Boarnet and Crane 1988; Heim 2012; Hrelja et al. 2012).
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and preserving local rents. Bárcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2018) study the
use of zoning as a strategic device by the regulators of two adjacent towns
that form a linear city. Each town is composed of a residential area and its
surroundings, which have no residential use but where ﬁrms may locate. They
consider that zoning costs are meaningful and show that both regulators zone
their towns when the ﬁxed zoning cost is low enough and decline to zone when
it is very high.5 The two symmetric equilibria coexist when the zoning costs
take intermediate values. Bárcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2017) study the reg-
ulators’ incentives to zone two adjacent towns when ﬁrms can only locate in
the residential area. In this setting, an equilibrium in which only one regulator
zones its town emerges for intermediate values of the ﬁxed zoning cost. The
zoning regulations forbid the local ﬁrm to locate very far from the consumers
of the neighboring town.6 However, this literature has not considered how the
nationality of the owners of the ﬁrms aﬀects zoning decisions by regulators.
Literature on zoning mainly considers competition between domestic ﬁrms.
However, in economic literature it is well known that the nationality of ﬁrms
plays a crucial role.7 The partial ownership of a local ﬁrm by foreign investors
may condition the regulators’ incentives to zone their towns and the optimal
design of zoning. Cato and Matsumura (2017) show other models in which
"whether the private ﬁrm is domestic or foreign often yields contrasting results
in the literature on mixed oligopolies. See Corneo and Jeanne (1994), Fjell and
5Bárcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2017) point out that zoning costs are meaningful because
"there are costs linked to studying regulation, to designing the maps that plot the diﬀerent
uses of diﬀerent areas in the town, to uploading those maps and regulations to the web site
that oﬀers the information; and there are costs for the staﬀ who inform about and watch for
non-fulﬁllment of the norms, to mention just a few."
6 Inoue et al. (2009) study the location of a public ﬁrm and a private ﬁrm in a city with
two symmetric districts, each of which is run by a local government. However, they do not
study zoning decisions.
7For example, Bárcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2016) show that the nationality of ﬁrms
inﬂuences the design of the optimal zoning by a regulator in a duopoly model of spatial price
discrimination. Matsushima and Matsumura (2006) analyze the spatial location of ﬁrms in a
mixed oligopoly when there are foreign private ﬁrms, and Matsumura et al. (2009) investigate
whether or not privatization is beneﬁcial from the viewpoint of social welfare in a monopolistic
competition model.
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Pal (1996), Pal and White (1998), Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2005a, 2005b),
Heywood and Ye (2009), and Lin and Matsumura (2012)." In our model, welfare
comprises the surplus of domestic consumers and the proﬁts obtained by local
investors in both towns. As a result, who owns the competing ﬁrms is a relevant
issue to keep in mind when designing optimal zoning.
There is empirical evidence of foreign ownership of ﬁrms located in neigh-
boring towns or countries. A 2003 reseach report called Foreign Investment:
U.S. Border Towns, 8 points out that "Since the creation of NAFTA, cities
located along the northern and southern borders of the United States have de-
veloped relationships with sister cities in Canada and Mexico, making free-trade
across the border even easier." It also argues that "NAFTA, which has created
a powerful free-trade zone among the U.S., Canada, and Mexico, has led to the
establishment of some "sister-city" relationships along the borders." With re-
gard to foreign investment the report states that "Much of this foreign direct
investment is concentrated in our neighbors to the north and south, Canada and
Mexico." Salcedo (2003) provides further evidence and points out that the struc-
ture of ownership of malls diﬀers from one country to another. For example,
malls in Eastern Europe are completely foreign-owned (partly by western Eu-
ropean investors) but malls of the middle East are mainly domestically-owned.
In Argentina investment came from a neighboring country: Chile. Chilean mall
developers are also active in other countries of South America.9
This paper considers a linear city composed of two adjacent towns whose
land is for residential use. Each town has a regulator which maximizes local
welfare, which comprises the local consumer surplus and the proﬁts obtained by
local investors. We assume that in each town a percentage α of the local ﬁrm is
owned by local investors and the rest is owned by investors from the neighboring
8Available at: http://www.bastianpr.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Foreign-
investment_-U.S.pdf
9 In Europe, French real estate investment trust Klépierre has recently acquired shopping
malls in Spain and the Netherlands and owns shopping centers in 57 cities in 16 countries
(http://www.klepierre.com/en/who-we-are/in-brief/).
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town. Local authorities are able to regulate the location of the ﬁrms within their
towns, but prices are freely decided by the two ﬁrms. To maintain a structure
of analysis close to the duopoly models analyzed in the seminal papers, we
consider that only one ﬁrm operates in each town, though they can sell their
products in both markets. Each regulator decides whether to zone its town or
not, and zoning does not entail a ﬁxed cost. In each town zoning may be used
to achieve the optimal location of the local ﬁrm by limiting some urban area to
residential use only. We consider that zoning deﬁnes two diﬀerent areas: an area
in which ﬁrms and consumers may share the same locations (both commercial
and residential uses) and an exclusively residential area.
Our results show that the incentives to zone one town, and the zoning con-
straints when applied, crucially depend on the percentage of the local ﬁrm owned
by local investors. When it is high enough both regulators zone their towns to
push the local ﬁrm towards the frontier with the other market in order to gain
some foreign consumers and to reduce local consumers’ transportation costs.
So zoning constraints forbid the local ﬁrm to locate very far from its rival. For
intermediate values of the percentage of the local ﬁrm owned by local residents
an asymmetric result emerges. In this case only one regulator resorts to zoning
despite the symmetry in the percentage of ownership of the neighboring ﬁrms.
This asymmetric result has been obtained before in the literature in a model
of the same nature when only local proﬁts matter, under the assumption that
ﬁxed zoning costs are meaningful (Bárcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga, 2017). In
this paper we do not consider ﬁxed zoning costs, so the asymmetric result arises
because foreign proﬁts are signiﬁcant. Thus, it may not be attractive to zone
the town when the rival does so, because then intense competition erodes the
proﬁts obtained by the ﬁrm from the other town. This plays an important role
when the equilibrium involves zoning in one town only and the regulator which
does not zone its town obtains higher social welfare than the other because
foreign proﬁts are substantial in comparison to local proﬁts. Finally, for a low
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enough weight of local proﬁts all possible equilibrium conﬁgurations, applying
zoning or declining to zone in each town, are possible because the objectives of
the regulator and the ﬁrms are not in conﬂict.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 studies the regulators’ incentives to zone their towns or not, and
Section 4 draws conclusions.
2 The model
Consumers are distributed uniformly and with unitary density along a linear
city, the interval [0, 1], that comprises two adjacent towns of the same size. The
town to the left, denoted as town 1, extends along the interval [0, 1/2], while the
town to the right (town 2) extends along the interval [1/2, 1]. Each consumer
buys only one unit of the good from the ﬁrm with the lowest delivered price:
The mill price plus the transportation cost. Consumers transport their purchase
home at a cost td2, where t is a positive constant and d is the distance from the
ﬁrm’s location to the consumer’s home. Each consumer derives a surplus from
consumption, gross of price and transportation costs, denoted by s. Thus, total
gross consumer surplus in each town is s/2. We assume that s is large enough
for all consumers to buy one unit of the product each.
There are two ﬁrms indexed by i (i = 1, 2) competing in the linear city.
Let xi denote the location of ﬁrm i. Firm 1 is the local ﬁrm of town 1 and
it is located within the limits of that town: x1 ∈ [0, 1/2]. Firm 2 is the local
ﬁrm of town 2 and it is located within the limits of that town: x2 ∈ [1/2, 1].
In each town the local regulator may apply zoning restrictions that constrain
the location of the local ﬁrm within the town. Thus, each town may have two
diﬀerent zones: an area that can be shared by consumers and the local ﬁrm and
an exclusively residential area. Locations are a long-term decision which cannot
therefore be changed. Firms’ production costs are normalized to zero.
We assume that the ownership of ﬁrms by investors from the two towns
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is symmetric: a fraction α of the local ﬁrm belongs to local investors and a
fraction 1−α belongs to investors from the other town. This setting enables us
to study incentives to zone on the part of the regulators that do not rely on the
asymmetry in the ownership of local ﬁrms between towns; it is also required to
avoid cumbersome computations.
The timing of the game is the following: In the ﬁrst stage the regulators
simultaneously decide whether to zone their towns or not. In the second stage,
when there are zoning regulations the locations where local ﬁrms are permitted
to set up are announced. In the third stage the ﬁrms simultaneously decide
their locations within their towns, taking into account any zoning constraints.
In stage four, the ﬁrms simultaneously set uniform prices. We solve the game
by backward induction to ﬁnd the subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
Let pi denote the price set by ﬁrm i (i = 1, 2). The location of the consumer
who is indiﬀerent as regards buying from one ﬁrm or the other, x, is obtained
from the following condition:
p1 + t(x− x1)2 = p2 + t(x− x2)2. (1)
From expression (1) the following is obtained:
x =
p2 − p1
2t(x2 − x1) +
x2 + x1
2
. (2)
Thus, the respective demands of ﬁrms 1 and 2 when they are not located at
1/2, are given by q1 and q2:
q1 =


x if 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
1 if x > 1
0 if x < 0
, q2 =


1− x if 0 ≤ 1− x ≤ 1
1 if 1− x > 1
0 if 1− x < 0
(3)
We proceed by backward induction, so we ﬁrst solve the fourth stage of the
game to obtain equilibrium prices. In this stage ﬁrms simultaneously set their
prices and their outputs are then determined by expression (3). The objective
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function of ﬁrm i is:
πi(pi, pj) = piqi, i = j; i, j = 1, 2. (4)
Substituting (2) and (3) in (4) and taking the ﬁrst order condition with
respect to prices for each ﬁrm we obtain the equilibrium prices when both ﬁrms
sell the good:10
p1 =
t
3
(x2 − x1)(2 + x1 + x2), p2 = t
3
(x2 − x1)(4− x1 − x2). (5)
From expressions (2) to (5), the proﬁts of ﬁrms 1 and 2 are:
π1 =
t
18
(x2 − x1)(2 + x1 + x2)2, π2 = t
18
(x2 − x1)(4− x1 − x2)2. (6)
Expressions for equilibrium prices (5), the location of the indiﬀerent con-
sumer (2), and ﬁrms’ proﬁts (6) can be used throughout the diﬀerent scenarios
analyzed in this paper.11
Each regulator’s objective function Wi is the sum of the local consumer
surplus, CSi, and the surplus of local investors. The latter comprises a fraction
α of the proﬁts of the local ﬁrm and a fraction 1−α of the proﬁts of the non-local
ﬁrm:
Wi = CSi + απi + (1− α)πj , i, j = 1, 2, i = j. (7)
To obtain the objective function for each regulator, ﬁrst consider that the
locations and prices set by the two ﬁrms are such that x > 1/2. In that case,
town 1’s social welfare (W1) comprises the following: The gross surplus of lo-
cal consumers s/2, minus the price and the transportation costs paid by local
consumers (who all buy from ﬁrm 1), plus a fraction α of the proﬁts of ﬁrm 1
(some from its sales in town 2), plus a fraction 1 − α of the proﬁts of ﬁrm 2
(obtained only from local consumers in town 2). When x = 1/2 each market
10The second order conditions of the problems that we analyze are always satisﬁed.
11The analysis that includes equations (1) to (6) can be found in Anderson et al. (1992,
Chapter 8).
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is covered by the local ﬁrm and local proﬁts are equal to consumer spending.
Finally, when x < 1/2 town 1’s social welfare is the following: the gross surplus
s/2, minus the price paid by local consumers (some buy from the local ﬁrm and
others from ﬁrm 2), minus the transportation costs of local consumers (those
located between 0 and x buy from ﬁrm 1 so they transport their purchase from
x1, and the rest buy from ﬁrm 2 and transport their purchase from x2), plus
a fraction α the proﬁts of ﬁrm 1 (which only sells to local consumers), plus a
fraction 1−α of the proﬁts of ﬁrm 2 (obtained from local consumers and others
from town 1). Following similar reasoning, W2 can be written. Equations (8)
and (9) show these expressions:
W1 =


s/2− p1/2−
 1/2
0
t(x− x1) 2dx+ αp1x
+(1− α)(1− x)p2
if x > 1/2
s/2− p1/2−
 1/2
0 t(x− x1) 2dx+ αp1/2
+(1− α)p2/2
if x = 1/2
s/2− p1x− p2(1/2− x)−
 x
0 t(x− x1) 2dx
−  1/2x t(x− x2) 2dx+ p1x+ (1− α)(1− x)p2 if x < 1/2
(8)
W2 =


s/2− p1(x− 1/2)− p2(1− x)−
 x
1/2 t(x− x1) 2dx
−  1/2x t(x− x2) 2dx+ α(1− x)p2 + (1− α)p1x
if x > 1/2
s/2− p2/2−
 1
1/2
t(x− x2) 2dx+ αp2/2
+(1− α)p1/2
if x = 1/2
s/2− p2/2−
 1
1/2 t(x− x2) 2dx+ α(1− x)p2
+(1− α)p1x
if x < 1/2
(9)
Figure 1 depicts CS1, π1 and π2 when x > 1/2. The lined area above p1+TC1
(from x = 0 to x = 1/2) measures the consumer surplus in town 1. The lined
area below p1 (from x = 0 to x = x) measures the proﬁts of ﬁrm 1, although
only a fraction α is considered from a social welfare viewpoint. Finally, the lined
area below p2 (from x = x to x = 1) represents the proﬁts of ﬁrm 2, but only a
fraction 1− α is considered from a social welfare viewpoint in town 1.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE]
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Figure 2 depicts CS2, π2 and π2 when x > 1/2. The lined area above p2+TC2
(from x = 0 to x = 1/2) measures the consumer surplus in town 2. The lined
area below p1 (from x = 0 to x = x) measures the proﬁts of ﬁrm 1. Finally, the
lined area below p2 (from x = x to x = 1) represents the proﬁts of ﬁrm 2.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE]
3 Results
In this section we study the optimal locations and welfare from the regulators’
viewpoints. We ﬁrst consider the case without zoning regulations, then we
describe the zoning design that achieves the optimal location of the local ﬁrm
depending on the behavior of the other regulator, with zoning in both towns
and in only one. Finally, we study the regulators’ incentives to zone their towns
or not.
3.1 Firms’ locations without zoning regulations
Let superscript NN denote that towns 1 and 2 are not zoned. Given that
∂π1/∂x1 < 0 and ∂π2/∂x2 > 0, when ﬁrms are free lo locate both ﬁrms locate
at the end points of the linear city (i.e. x1 = 0 and x2 = 1), as shown by
d’Aspremont et al. (1979). Thus, ﬁrms’ locations do not depend on the value of
parameter α. It is easy to see that the proﬁts of ﬁrm i, its price, and the social
welfare in each town are the following:
πNNi =
t
2
, pNNi = t, W
NN
i =
s
2
− t
24
, i = 1, 2.
3.2 Firms’ locations with zoning in both towns
Both towns are zoned, so each ﬁrm must locate in the area allowed in its town.
Given that ∂π1/∂x1 < 0 and ∂π2/∂x2 > 0, the location that maximizes the
proﬁts of a ﬁrm for a given location of its rival is the location that maximizes the
distance between the two ﬁrms while observing the zoning constraints. Firm 1
locates as close as allowed to the left border of its town (x1 = 0). Similarly, ﬁrm 2
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locates as close to the right border of its town (x2 = 1) as the zoning constraints
allow. Proposition 1 describes the zoning design and shows equilibrium locations.
Proposition 1 When α ≤ 3/8 there are no zoning restrictions and the
equilibrium locations are x∗1 = 0 and x
∗
2 = 1. When α > 3/8 zoning regulations
forbid ﬁrm 1 to locate within the interval [0, 1/2− 3/16α) and force ﬁrm 2 to
locate outside the interval (1/2 + 3/16α, 1]. Equilibrium locations are x∗1 =
1/2− 3/16α and x∗2 = 1/2 + 3/16α.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that ﬁrm 1 is located closer to the
middle of the market than ﬁrm 2, so it captures some consumers that live in town
2. In that case, from (8) we obtain that W1 = s/2− p1/2−
 1/2
0
t(x−x1) 2dx+
απ1+(1−α)π2. Substituting (2), (5) and (6) in this expression, maximizing with
respect to x1, and solving for x1, the regulator’s reaction function is x1(x2) =
(4 − 2x2 − 24α +

2(8x22 − 24α+ 48x2α+ 288α2 − 25− 8x2))/6. Using (9),
social welfare for the regulator of town 2 isW2 = s/2−p1(x−1/2)−p2(1−x)− x
1/2 t(x−x1) 2dx−
 1/2
x t(x−x2) 2dx+απ2+(1−α)π1. Substituting (2), (5) and
(6) in this expression, maximizing with respect to x2, and solving for x2, the re-
action function is x2(x1) = (2−x1+8α−2
√
x12 + 2α− 4x1 + 16α2 − 2− x1)/3.
Solving for the two reaction functions simultaneously gives x∗1 = 1/2 − 3/16α
and x∗2 = 1/2 + 3/16α. These values are valid only when α > 3/8, so in that
case ﬁrms 1 and 2 adopt symmetric locations with regard to the border between
the two towns and obtain the same market share. Due to the symmetry of the
model, the same is obtained when it is assumed that it is ﬁrm 2 which can cap-
ture consumers from town 1. When α ≤ 3/8 the optimal locations are x∗1 = 0
and x∗2 = 1.
When α > 3/8, ﬁrms locate optimally when the zoning regulations forbid
ﬁrm 1 to locate within the interval [0, 1/2− 3/16α) and ﬁrm 2 to locate within
the interval (1/2 + 3/16α, 1]. To show that the zoning regulation works, note
that, given the location of ﬁrm 2, ﬁrm 1 locates as far as possible from its rival
to mitigate price competition and thus maximize proﬁts. With the suggested
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zoning regulation, ﬁrm 1 chooses the closest location to x = 0 that is allowed,
which in this case is x∗1 = 1/2 − 3/16α. From ﬁrm 2’ s viewpoint the analysis
is symmetrical so x∗2 = 1/2 + 3/16α. When α ≤ 3/8, the equilibrium locations
are x∗1 = 0 and x
∗
2 = 1, so zoning constraints are not required.
Proposition 1 shows that ﬁrms locate symmetrically with regard to the bor-
der between the two towns. Moreover, the left zone of town 1, x ∈ [0, 1/2− 3/16α),
and the right zone of town 2, x ∈ (1/2 + 3/16α, 1], are for residential use only.
The remaining zones of the towns (i.e. the central area of the linear city) may
be shared by ﬁrms and consumers. In equilibrium, given that ﬁrms are located
symmetrically, both ﬁrms set the same prices, sell the same output, and obtain
the same proﬁts. Note that the lower α is, the further apart the two ﬁrms are
ﬁnally located. This is because local proﬁts are less substantial from a social
welfare viewpoint and the regulator has more incentives to increase the distance
from the rival. Thus, in each town, the lower the parameter α is, the smaller
the area exclusively for residential use is.
Let superscript ZZ denote that both towns are zoned. It is easy to compute
that when α > 3/8 the proﬁts of ﬁrm i, its price, and social welfare in each
town are given by:
πZZi =
3t
16α
, pZZi =
3t
8α
, WZZi =
s
2
− (27− 72α+ 64α
2)t
1536α2
, i = 1, 2.
When α ≤ 3/8 the results are the same as when there are no zoning regula-
tions because the locations are the same.
3.3 Firms’ locations with regulatory restrictions in one town only
Now assume that only one town is zoned. It can be assumed with no loss
of generality that only the regulator of town 1 restricts the location of its ﬁrm.
The results when only ﬁrm 2 is zoned are symmetric. Proposition 2 shows
equilibrium locations and zoning constraints.
Proposition 2 When α > 3/8 the zoning regulations in town 1 forbid ﬁrm
1 to locate within the interval

0, (2− 24α+2(24α+ 288α2 − 25))/6. Firm
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1 locates at x∗1 = (2 − 24α +

2(24α+ 288α2 − 25))/6 and ﬁrm 2 locates at
x∗2 = 1. When α ≤ 3/8 there are no zoning restrictions and the equilibrium
locations are: x∗1 = 0 and x
∗
2 = 1.
Proof. Note that although ﬁrms decide their locations simultaneously in the
third stage of the game, the regulator of town 1 chooses the location restrictions
in the second stage. The preceding analysis shows that in equilibrium ﬁrm 2 is
located at x2 = 1, since it is not subject to regulations. Thus, the result of the
game is the same when W1 is maximized subject to x2 = 1 as when the reaction
function of the regulator of town 1 is calculated for x2 = 1. For the sake of
simplicity, we use the latter approach.12
The regulator of town 1 maximizes W1 taking into account that x2 = 1.
Thus, the ﬁrst order condition obtained above can be used: x1(x2) = (4 −
2x2−24α+

2(8x22 − 24α+ 48x2α+ 288α2 − 25− 8x2))/6, solving for x2 = 1.
The solution is x∗1 = (2 − 24α +

2(24α+ 288α2 − 25))/6 and x∗2 = 1 when
α > 3/8; and x∗1 = 0 and x
∗
2 = 1 when α ≤ 3/8. The zoning regulation
in town 1 when α > 3/8 guarantees that ﬁrm 1 locates at x∗1 = (2 − 24α +
2(24α+ 288α2 − 25))/6 because it is not allowed to locate within the interval
0, (2− 24α+2(24α+ 288α2 − 25))/6, so it locates as far as allowed from
ﬁrm 2 at x∗1.
Given that only town 1 is zoned this regulator tries to push the local ﬁrm
towards its rival to gain market share. This incentive is weakened as α decreases
because the regulator is then more interested in the proﬁts of the non-local ﬁrm,
so it tries to avoid any reduction in those proﬁts by increasing the distance
between the local ﬁrm and its rival. Thus, in town 1 the lower the parameter α
becomes the lower the size of the area with a residential use only is.
Superscript ZN denotes that town 1 is zoned and town 2 is not. It is
easy to compute the proﬁts, outputs, and prices set by the two ﬁrms, and
12This approach is valid as long as x2 = 1. When x2 depends on x1 this way of ﬁnding the
solution is not valid as one has to proceed backwards.
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the social welfare of each town for the ZN case. The expressions are cum-
bersome, so we present the social welfare computations required to analyze
the regulators’ decisions as to whether or not to zone their towns. Let β =
√
50 + 48α+ 576α2. Thus:
WZN1 =
s
2
+
t(−13824α3 + 576α2(β − 3) + 24α(87 + 2β)− 5(47 + 10β))
1944
,
WZN2 =
s
2
− t(998 + 55296α
3 + 67β − 576α2(29 + 4β) + 24α(33β − 211))
1296
.
To simplify the presentation let γ = −13824α
3+576α2(β−3)+24α(87+2β)−5(47+10β)
1944
and δ = −998+55296α3+67β−576α2(29+4β)+24α(33β−211)1296 . Thus, expressions for so-
cial welfare can be rewritten as follows:
WZN1 =
s
2
+ tγ, WZN2 =
s
2
+ tδ.
3.4 To zone or not to zone: The regulators’ choices
Above we solved the fourth and third stages of the game taking into account
the optimal location restrictions enforced by the regulators. We now study
whether the regulators have incentives to zone their towns or not. Table 1
shows the social welfare obtained by the two towns when α > 3/8, depending
on whether their regulators zone each town or not. The case when α ≤ 3/8 is
of little interest since the social welfare maximizing locations are met without
zoning.
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE]
Next we show the diﬀerent equilibria conﬁgurations in the ﬁrst stage of the
game.
Proposition 3 When α > 0.4765 both towns are zoned. When 3/8 < α ≤
0.4765 only one regulator zones its town. When α ≤ 3/8 all four equilibrium
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conﬁgurations are possible: Both regulators refuse to zone, both zone their towns,
and only one regulator zones.
Proof. The case when α ≤ 3/8 is standard because ﬁrms are always located at
the endpoints of the segment [0, 1], so the results do not depend on the zoning
constraints. Thus, we have four equilibria: both regulators refuse to zone, both
of them zone, and only one regulator zones.
When α > 3/8 we ﬁnd that WZZ1 −WNZ1 =
− t(729−1944α+1769472α5−18432α4(29+4β)+768α3(33β−211)+32α2(1052+67β))41472α2 > 0 if
and only if α > 0, 4765; andWZN1 −WNN1 = t(−77−6912α
3
−25β+288α2(β−3)+12α(87+2β))
972 >
0 if and only if α ≥ 3/8. For town 2 the results are symmetric. As a result,
when 3/8 < α ≤ 0.4765 only one regulator zones. When α > 0.4765 both towns
are zoned because zoning is a dominant strategy for both regulators.
It is easy to check that when only one town is zoned, and zoning regulations
constrain the location of the local ﬁrm the town without zoning obtains higher
social welfare.13 This is because zoning constraints increase the proﬁts of the
local ﬁrm but when α is low (3/8 < α ≤ 0.4765) the proﬁts of the ﬁrm located
in the other market are more important for the local regulator than the proﬁts
of the local ﬁrm.
4 Conclusions
Zoning regulations may help local authorities to achieve social welfare goals.
Regulators take into account local consumers’ transportation costs and local and
foreign proﬁts, so local authorities may use zoning strategically. Without zoning
regulations ﬁrms locate far from their rivals to mitigate price competition, so
zoning can be used to push ﬁrms into locating closer to the rivals.
The existence of equally shared ownership of ﬁrms in two neighboring towns
aﬀects the optimal design of zoning in both towns and the regulators’ incentives
to zone each town or not. When the weight of local proﬁts in social welfare
13Comparing WZN
1
and WZN
2
for 3/8 < α ≤ 0.4765 we obtain that WZN
1
< WZN
2
because
δ > γ .
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is high enough compared to foreign proﬁts, both towns are zoned and zoning
constraints are intense. Thus, the higher this weight is the closer together ﬁrms
are encouraged to locate because zoning regulations push the local ﬁrm towards
its rival.
When local proﬁts are of intermediate signiﬁcance an asymmetric result
emerges: only one town is zoned, despite the symmetry in the weight of local
and foreign proﬁts in the local welfare of both towns. This is because foreign
proﬁts are now more important, so it is not so attractive to zone the town
when the rival does so: In that case, competition would be very ﬁerce, which
damages the proﬁts obtained by the ﬁrm in the other town. As a result, when
the equilibrium involves zoning in one town only, the town that is not zoned
obtains higher social welfare than its rival because foreign proﬁts are greater
than local ones.
Finally, when the weight of local proﬁts in social welfare is very low both
regulators have incentives to locate their ﬁrms very far from their rival to avoid
damaging the proﬁts obtained in the other town. The regulators’ incentives and
the incentives of the ﬁrms are then not in conﬂict, so zoning is not necessary.
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Fig. 1 Consumers’ surplus in town 1 and ﬁrms’ proﬁts when x > 1/2.
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Fig. 2 Consumers’ surplus in town 2 and ﬁrms’ proﬁts when x > 1/2.
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Table 1. Payoﬀ matrix in the ﬁrst stage of the game for α > 3/8.
Town 1\2 Z N
Z
s
2 − (27−72α+64α
2)t
1536α2
s
2 − (27−72α+64α
2)t
1536α2
s
2 + tγ
s
2 + tδ
N
s
2 + tδ
s
2 + tγ
s
2 − t24
s
2 − t24
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